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From the Phased Manufacturing Programme 
to Frugal Engineering
Some Initial Propositions
Nasir Tyabji
Although the structural reforms, initiated in 1991, did 
not lead to any appreciable increase in either the 
efficiency or the export orientation of Indian 
manufacturing firms, unexpectedly, there has been a 
visible improvement in manufacturing design 
capabilities in certain segments, for instance, in the 
motor vehicle sector. The paper suggests that the 
development of “frugal engineering”—an approach of 
“frugality” in resolving complex design problems—is a 
real advance. It suggests, further, that this approach 
developed from the experiences of the procedures laid 
down in the phased manufacturing programme of the 
1950s, and first found expression in the successful forays 
into some specific export markets by Indian vehicle 
manufacturers in the late 1970s and 1980s. Although this 
design expertise cannot solve the problems of 
manufacturing efficiency, particularly across the wider 
industrial sphere, it indicates that Indian firms have the 
expertise to resolve problems related to the 
manufacturing sphere if strategic goals are appropriately 
set by managers. 
Frugal Engineering: The Latest Managerial Fad?
Frugal engineering predated frugal innovation to de-scribe, in somewhat the same way as reverse engineer-ing, norms of engineering practice in Indian companies 
designed to lower the cost of product development and manu-
facturing.1 Carlos Ghosn, the chief executive offi cer of Nissan 
and Renault, is usually attributed with the fi rst use of the term 
(Radjou et al 2012). In mainstream management circles, frugal 
engineering was highlighted by the Economist (2010a, 2010b).
Frugal innovation has arisen not from the writings of aca-
demics or experts but out of management responses to unique 
economic, social and competitive challenges faced by fi rms in 
developing countries. There are no generally accepted guide-
lines or simple rules for all to follow on how frugal innovation 
can materialise into any perceived or promised results. Frugal 
innovation, as it stands, seems to be complex, multifaceted 
and can be interpreted and applied in a number of ways in dif-
ferent fi rms (BS 2012).
With management literature fi rst outlining the frugal inno-
vation space, and now subsequently being followed by re-
search and empirical concerns by the academic community, 
the dominant view may be defi ned by the management com-
munity. However, to make it a good “fi t” for organisations to 
effectively imitate or adopt notions of frugal innovation strate-
gies, academic research is needed to help defi ne its full poten-
tial as well as limitations. For instance, towards the end of last 
century, “lean” processes based on eliminating waste (for 
 example, lean engineering and just in time manufacturing) 
diffused from Japan’s Toyota Production System (TPS) into 
mainstream fi rms. The lean concept stems from the Japanese 
management and Total Quality Management literature. 
The Legacy of Lean Practices
Lean manufacturing is emerging as the dominant paradigm 
for the design and operation of current manufacturing facili-
ties. Lean is usually understood to be relevant to the “opera-
tions” of a manufacturing enterprise, meaning those processes 
associated with material supply, component production, and 
delivery of products and services to the customer. However, 
“lean thinking” can also be applied outside manufacturing 
o perations, although examples of this, such as applications in 
service-based enterprises, are relatively rare. Knowledge-
based activities such as design, new product introduction 
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(NPI), engineering, and product development (PD) are areas 
within an enterprise where the potential benefi ts from the 
adoption of Lean principles may be signifi cant.
Western companies tend to focus on Lean through the ap-
plication of tools and techniques, whereas their Japanese 
counterparts talk of philosophy and culture. The philosophical 
perspective is a multidimensional approach affecting the entire 
organisation in every function and encompassing a wide vari-
ety of management practices—just-in-time, quality systems, 
work teams, cellular manufacturing, supplier management—
in an integrated system. Whatever the perspective, the elimi-
nation of waste is the principle that has traditionally been at 
the heart of the Lean approach. In the case of Toyota, the PD 
system has been the key to success and Toyota’s Lean manufac-
turing system is actually an extension of their product develop-
ment philosophy and not the reverse. However, most fi rms are 
focusing their Lean initiatives at manufacturing operations 
with few attempts to adopt Lean in design-related activities.
There is a wide variety of examples—such as software, con-
struction and aerospace—where Lean has been applied. In 
software, the consideration of the waste principle addresses 
the shortening of long information feedback loops, the exist-
ence of which is cited as the reason why over 50% of all newly 
developed software is seldom, if ever, reused. The result of 
shortening feedback loops creates fl ow, increases speed and 
quality, and hence reduces cost and adds value. The major im-
plementation issue here was the requirement for deep changes 
in the way organisations are managed. Within the construc-
tion industry the Lean principle of waste elimination in the 
design process is conceptualised as a fl ow of information, 
which lends itself to waste reduction through minimising the 
amount of time before information is used. Value generation 
arises from capturing the customer’s requirements and trans-
mitting these accurately in the overall design process. In later 
work the analogy between the roles of information in the PD 
value stream and material in manufacturing has been noted.
The fi rst principle of Lean is to “specify value,” which can be 
stated as: “A capability provided to a customer at the right time 
at an appropriate price as defi ned in each case by the cus-
tomer.” However, when applying these principles to PD it is rec-
ognised that waste is much more diffi cult to identify than in a 
manufacturing environment. In manufacturing, excess inven-
tory or work in progress (WIP), which is considered a form of 
waste, is physically and fi nancially visible. However, in PD the 
WIP inventory is generally in the form of information. As a re-
sult of work carried out as part of the US Lean Aerospace Initia-
tive, it was argued that the usual defi nitions of value did not 
provide the necessary precision when applied to identifying 
the root causes of the waste that is present in most PD proc-
esses. Value is added in PD when useful information is pro-
duced. The value of this information can be to increase cer-
tainty or reduce risk. Value in the PD process can be created by 
adding as well as taking away activities.
Set-based concurrent engineering (or set-based design), as 
practised by Toyota, is suggested in as the preferred approach to 
Lean PD. Set-based design imposes agreed constraints across 
 different functions to ensure that a fi nal subsystem  solution, cho-
sen from a set of alternatives from a particular function (such as 
body, power train, engine management) will work with conver-
gent solutions from all other functions. During the design process 
as each alternative is evaluated, trade-offs are made, weaker solu-
tions are eliminated, and new ones are created, often by com-
bining components in new ways. Redundancy is built into the 
system, radically reducing risk. Instead of being designed from 
the top down, the actual system confi guration evolves.
The generation use and reuse of knowledge/information are 
the key to a successful adoption of Lean in PD. Standardised con-
current engineering techniques are effective in sharing and re-
using knowledge/information at the detail design phase. This 
sharing of design (and manufacturing knowledge) across the 
product introduction process is viewed as a knowledge manage-
ment problem. The challenge is in ensuring that the information 
is structured in such a way as to make it communicable between 
systems. Systems for controlling documents, central databases, 
knowledge-based systems, project management systems, CAD 
(computer-aided design)/CAM (computer-aided manufacturing)/
CAE (computer-aided engineering)/PDM (product data manage-
ment) systems, and web-based data-sharing and communication 
tools can all be used to facilitate Lean. 
TELCO’s Technological Ascendance 
The Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company (TELCO) was 
incorporated in September 1945 at Jamshedpur following Tata 
Sons taking over the Singhbhum Shops from East India Rail-
ways in June 1945. Started with the objective of producing 
 locomotives and general engineering equipment, TELCO’s fi rst 
locomotive was produced in 1952 (Bowonder 1998: 646–47). 
Subsequently, it collaborated with Daimler-Benz for the manu-
facture of trucks and buses and was permitted to manufacture 
three to fi ve tonne diesel vehicles. It was envisaged that the 
engine would be manufactured at the end of the last stage, in 
1959. Daimler-Benz had 10% equity stake in TELCO. 
As there was need for expansion of capacity, TELCO started a 
new motor vehicle manufacturing unit at Pune in 1965. To 
e stablish a technological base for indigenous capability it ac-
quired the long-established Investa Machine Tool Company. This 
unit supplied the machine tools needed by TELCO. The starting 
of a design centre in 1967 when no major Indian fi rm had any 
research and development (R&D) activity showed the impor-
tance given to design and new product development (Bowonder 
1998: 649). In fact, it was asserted that in TELCO’s philosophy, as 
in that of Daimler-Benz, a truck or an automobile was prima-
rily a high-grade technical product with a commercial content 
and not a piece of merchandise which happened, unfortu-
nately, to have a technical content (TELCO 1969: 1243–44). 
This remarkable statement of manufacturing philosophy 
was made by the chairperson, Sumant Moolgaokar (1906–89). 
Equally remarkable was his assertion, made as early as 1953, 
that the govern ment was the only agency through which the 
productive effi  ciency of the manufac turing sector could be 
 increased (Moolgaokar 1953). Moolgaokar was an engineer 
trained at the City and Guilds Institute and Imperial College, 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  april 4, 2015 vol l no 14 47
London. In the pre-independence period he had worked in the 
cement industry and helped develop the manufacture of 
c ement machinery during the World War II. After the forma-
tion of TELCO in 1945, he was closely associated with its devel-
opment until his death. He played an active role as a con sultant 
in planning the development of the heavy engineering indus-
try, notably in conducting a benchmark survey of existing engi-
neering capacity in the country in the mid-1950s ( India 1954). 
For some years before the end of the collaboration agree-
ment there had been no Mercedes-Benz vehicle identical to the 
Indian product because of various modifi cations and improve-
ments incorporated in the Tata Mercedes Benz (TMB) vehicle to 
make it suitable for the diffi cult road and operating conditions 
in the country. By the time the 15-year agreement between 
TELCO and Daimler-Benz expired in March 1969, the Press Tool 
Division at Pune was in full production; the complex tools and 
dies produced there eliminated dependence on imports for cur-
rent operations and also provided the tooling for the future 
(TELCO 1969: 1243–44). The facilities of the M achine Tool Divi-
sion at Pune, as a result of an agreement with Rheinstahl 
 Henschel AG, West Germany, enabled TELCO to produce indig-
enously the large number of special purpose machine-tools 
needed for replacing and modernising the equipment of the 
Automobile Division at Jamshedpur, most of which had been 
operating continuously for many years (TELCO 1968: 1189–91). 
The manufacture of steam locomotives at Jamshedpur, 
fi rst begun in January 1952, ceased in June 1970 on the ter-
mination of the Company’s commitment to the Railways. The 
Company had implemented plans for the utilisation of the 
workers and plant facilities released by the cessation of loco-
motive manufacture (TELCO 1970: 1309–11). New products, 
including tippers, forklifts and dumper placers, developed by 
the Company’s research and development engineers, were 
being produced in the shops previously engaged in locomo-
tive manufacture. 
Reconditioning and Redesigning Old Equipment
Many plants in the country, in many industries, had been al-
lowed to deteriorate through neglect, either overworked for 
quick profi ts, or badly maintained, so that their capacity de-
creased in the course of time. In TELCO it was recognised that 
the size of the assets of a Company did not determine the Com-
pany’s capabilities of production, especially on a continuing 
basis (TELCO 1973: 1258–60). Great attention was paid to the 
maintenance of equipment, the reconditioning of old equip-
ment and replacement of worn-out machines. Large shops 
both at Jamshedpur and Pune for reconditioning and rede-
signing old equipment, and the Machine Tool Division at Pune 
were actively meeting a signifi cant part of the Company’s re-
quirement of replacement machines which were hitherto im-
ported. Import of machine tools had become increasingly dif-
fi cult and very costly, and indigenous manufacturers were not 
able to meet requirements fully, especially for the more sophis-
ticated special purpose machines. 
It was not only through new models that technological 
 development was expressed through the benefi t of design and 
development efforts. Existing models were being continuously 
upgraded to attain higher standards of performance and to 
fuel-effi cient, rugged and abuse-proof product with low lifecy-
cle costs (TELCO 1982: 1276–77). Moreover, engineering devel-
opments in TELCO were not merely restricted to improvements 
in products. The automotive industry drew upon a multitude of 
complex, fast-changing technologies where know-how was be-
ing developed at an ever-increasing rate. Superfi cially, it would 
appear attractive to acquire such know-how merely through 
buying the latest but this was not to be the path best suited for 
long-term needs (TELCO 1984: 1180–81). The longer and harder 
route of training workers who were capable of absorbing the 
latest technology and giving them the facilities needed for their 
development would ensure that the upgradation of technology 
became an inevitable component of growth in general. Such an 
approach did not exclude the import of existing technology or 
even of component knocked down packs to start with. This was 
the model TELCO was encouraged by the government to adopt. 
Upgrading the manufacturing facility had been a major element 
of TELCO’s strategy. Along with the introduction of new manu-
facturing technologies, testing facilities were upgraded (Bow-
onder 1998: 663). The focus was on continuous improvement of 
productivity, quality and manufacturability through automation. 
In order to produce the 407 series of light commercial vehicles 
(LCV) in a targeted time frame, TELCO installed a number of 
computer numerical control (CNC) and milling machines. A new 
electronics centre was  established at Pune to support the man-
ufacture and maintenance of CNC machines. These  contributed 
to the establishment of a base for a higher level of fl exibility.
Once the 407 series of LCV production started, the develop-
ment of the heavier 608 series began. Manufacture of CNC ma-
chines with collaboration started during 1986–87 (Bowonder 
1998: 663). TELCO started retrofi tting sophisticated control 
systems on older machines as part of its reconditioning and 
modernisation programme. In 1987–88, a machine recondi-
tioning programme was started as a part of the continuous plant 
rejuvenation efforts. After initiating steps for introducing the 
608 series of LCV, the next major effort was to develop produc-
tion facilities for the 206 series pickup vehicles. 
Because of the entry of global players, TELCO found it neces-
sary to increase the level of automation. In 1994–95, for the fi rst 
time in the country, TELCO produced three basic robots in col-
laboration with Nachi–Fujikoshi of Japan (Bowonder 1998: 663). 
These were: spot-welding robot, sealant application robot, and 
arc-welding robot. The continuous improvement of manufactur-
ing systems, increased automation and retrofi tting of older 
equipment had been major thrusts. The product development 
 efforts and manufacturing technology improvements were done 
in a matching manner so that productivity never lagged.
The pool of technical talent engaged in various activities con-
stantly interacted with vehicle designers. A vehicle concept was 
thus developed by the vehicle design engineers through an 
 intensive cross-fl ow of information from the marketing, testing, 
engineering, and production and service functions (TELCO 1988: 
1672–73). It was this simultaneous engineering that had permit-
ted speed up in the introduction of new vehicles. The traditional 
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sequential procedure would have added years to the product in-
troduction cycle. The best ideas available internationally, with 
those from engineers in different disciplines, as also suppliers 
and customers, contributed to the fi nal design.
TELCO devised a strategy which used indigenous com-
petence along with acquisition of technology from abroad 
(Bowonder 1998: 657). Most of these collaborations had been 
in the area of manufacturing process technology. The transfer 
of manufacturing process technology and rapid learning of 
competencies for new product engineering helped TELCO to 
b ecome technologically competitive.
Resource Acquisition Strategy in Passenger Cars
After a longer period of organic and incremental growth 
TELCO was hit by a cyclical 40% shrinkage of the Indian CV 
market in 2000–01 which triggered a transformative phase of 
restructuring, process improvements and rejuvenation of its 
management, preparing the ground for bolder strategic initia-
tives in the future (Bruche 2010: 6). While TELCO’s high degree 
of vertical integration was a boon in better times, this very fac-
tor was responsible for the Company’s underperformance in 
trying times. While it reaped the benefi ts of producing virtu-
ally all its components in-house, the advantage turned into its 
Achilles heel when the going became diffi cult with the adverse 
situation magnifying itself all along the value chain (EPW 
1999: 2284). In an attempt to deal with the cyclical demand 
patterns in the commercial vehicle industry, the Company 
planned to apply a strategy to transform itself from a domestic 
commercial vehicle maker to an automotive company. TELCO 
also adopted outsourcing and moved away from high levels of 
vertical integration (EPW 1999: 2284).
The focus of competitiveness had shifted from manufactur-
ing capability to product development. Supply chains were in-
creasingly driving manufacturing activity with effi cient as-
sembling as the focus of attention (Bowonder 2004: 292). This 
meant that product variety, product platforms, product devel-
opment fl exibility and product development cycle time were 
becoming the differentiating elements in competition. With 
the growth of the commercial vehicle market slowing down, 
global competition had essentially focused on the car market—
the medium and the low-end market.
The entry of the renamed TELCO, Tata Motors Ltd (TML), into 
passenger cars, its ascent as a relevant domestic player and its 
recent internationalisation of sales and manufacturing in the 
passenger car segment had been underpinned by an intricate 
asset acquisition, accumulation and organisational learning 
process (Bruche 2010: 7). In hindsight, four distinct but over-
lapping phases of this process could be discerned which were 
sometimes triggered by external events and usually driven in-
side the company through strategic initiatives or projects. The 
phases were not results of a grand strategy, but rather the out-
come of a strong intent to overcome a situation of backward-
ness coupled with an evolutionary search under a changing 
i nstitutional context and internal resource conditions. 
When the management of TML decided to enter and compete 
in the passenger car segment it relied to a considerable extent 
on strategic assets and capabilities built during its history as a 
pure CV manufacturer. Long before TML entered the passenger 
car segment in the early 1990s the Company had taken some 
steps to extend its technological base and upgrade its capabili-
ties in automobile design and manufacturing (TELCO 1969: 
1243). The establishment of an Engineering R esearch Centre at 
Pune in 1967 facilitated the creation of an internal engineering 
force which would increase TML’s absorptive capacity for exter-
nal technologies and create a basis for indigenous product de-
velopment. A more immediate facilitating condition was the 
antecedent development and manufacture of LCVs (the 407 
model launched in 1986, followed by the Tata mobile pickup in 
1988) which provided a platform, engine technology, and man-
ufacturing as well as tooling capabilities for the entry into pas-
senger cars (TELCO 1989: 1824).
The initial entry of TML into passenger cars relied on an 
 incremental extension or resource leverage from its light com-
mercial vehicles as both the Sierra (launched 1991) and the 
Estate (launched 1992) were built on the platform of the pick-
up (Bruche 2010: 8). As B Bowonder, Director at Tata Manage-
ment Training Centre, writes in his account of the TML’s small 
car development project: “the learning needed for making a 
car essentially started with the pickup vehicle 207” (Bowonder 
2004: 300). While the initial entry was focused on the large 
car segment it had become increasingly clear that the Indian 
passenger car market would for the foreseeable future be a 
small car market. After market analyses and feasibility studies 
TML started in 1994 its attempt to develop the fi rst Indian 
small car for the domestic market, the Indica. The car was to 
be positioned as a competitor to the market leading Maruti 
800 of the Japanese car maker Suzuki. In terms of its principal 
approach in the Indica project, TML
adopted the philosophy that all components critical to the car business 
were not to be sourced but should be produced internally. Specialised 
products were to be procured, especially those available in the market. 
Products for which suppliers had to make substantial investments would 
be done through joint ventures. Finally, generic components would be 
procured from good suppliers in India. With this in mind, critical capa-
bilities needed from a long-term perspective were identifi ed. Potential 
partners were identifi ed for all critical components not available. This 
was done keeping in mind that the alliance relationship should give Tata 
Motors some inherent learning value (Bowonder 2004: 310).
The development process involved some 700 engineers and 
cost, including tooling and setting up of production facilities, 
$400 million, compared with well over $2 billion such a proc-
ess would cost in a developed country (Bruche 2010: 9). TML 
also established a new organisational structure for tiered sup-
plier management and entrusted the Tata Group affi liate Tata 
Automobile Components (TACO), newly formed in 1995, with 
this task. In the time span of only four years TML signifi cantly 
improved its capability to manage automobile development 
projects and used the signifi cant learning opportunities to ex-
pand its organisational as well as staff-level skill sets. The 
physical proximity of R&D, tooling and production in one place 
(Pune) were an advantage in building the complex concurrent 
engineering capabilities needed in automotive development 
projects (Bruche 2010: 9).
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The Nano Project
TML was weak in technological capability, especially in prod-
uct development capability. In 2003, when a project was 
started as an advanced engineering project, the objective was 
to develop a car that would be “ultra cheap” (Lim et al 2009: 
16). The commercial project for the car was initiated in 2005. 
The team was given a base model product and the target price 
of $2,500 and minimum requirements of performance. This in-
vestigative process was guided by the three parameters: accept-
able cost ($2,500 price level), acceptable performance and reg-
ulatory compliance (safety and environmental regulation). The 
lean product development (LPD) process is initially a reverse 
process of exploring a given product concept to achieve a drastic 
reduction in cost while adhering to the design parameters.
PD activities are stretched to reduce cost in manufacturing. 
According to V Suhasrabuddhey, divisional manager, Small 
Car Project Offi ce, they did an exercise called the design for 
manufacturing and assembling whereby the design effi ciency 
of each of the assemblies was examined (Lim 2009: 18). Some 
of the car’s design, even though the car’s design is basically an 
integral design, was made modular, so that the car could be 
built and shipped in segments to be assembled in different 
 locations. This also implies that the PD process had considered 
cost reductions for the manufacturing process. The lean 
 design principle was stretched to vendor management. The 
suppliers participated in developing components with reduced 
cost at an early stage of product development. It is known that 
value analysis and value engineering had been diffused to the 
major suppliers in India. Suhasrabuddhey mentioned the 
 suppliers’ participation in LPD.
The main cost components of a car were its power train (con-
sisting of the engine, transmission, drive shafts, clutch, and 
axle) that typically accounted for 25%–30% of a car’s total ma-
terials cost; rolling chassis items (the wheels, brakes, and steer-
ing) that contributed another 20%–25%; and the remainder 
spread over body parts and trim (Palepu et al 2011: 6). Roughly, 
70% of suppliers were local, and 30% foreign. In aggregate, 
85% of the car by value was outsourced. Internally, Tata engi-
neers played a key role in the overall design as well as on par-
ticular components. One such component was the engine. 
More than half of the components were proprietary parts de-
signed by suppliers themselves (Palepu et al 2011: 7).
The entire system was being re-invented. Innovation at the aggregate 
level trickled down to system, then to sub-systems, then to parts. We 
went through a tremendous amount of iteration in the design process. 
The entire engine was redesigned thrice, the entire body was 
r edesigned twice, and the fl oor plan of the car redesigned around 10 
times, the wiper system redesigned more than 11 times. In any other 
project, you very clearly defi ne the layout and targets, and work to-
wards it where execution excellence comes into play. Whereas here, it 
was more of iterating with design, re-defi ning targets as we were mov-
ing on, and working with suppliers through the re-designs (Girish 
Wagh, Nano Project Head quoted in Palepu et al 2011: 8).
Again,
we instituted frequent sessions to bring everyone together. Every 
morning a group of us—sometimes up to 30—would meet for sessions 
lasting as long as four hours, an entire morning where we would 
 express  concerns and issues, challenge assumptions, appreciate 
 failures, celebrate achievements, and recognise delays. More impor-
tant, bringing the team together allowed us to take decisions fast. 
Since there were so many iterations, delayed decisions would have 
been very costly. There were many young people in the team who had 
a lot of humility to learn.
Although a new organisation was created drawing primarily 
from lateral recruits rather than internal TML personnel, the 
project team leveraged expertise more broadly from within TML, 
too. Assistance from the commercial vehicle arm was sought to 
identify ways to lay alternate fuel lines, make better use of plas-
tics, or build better lamps (Palepu et al 2011: 5, 9).
TML had a strategy of active utilisation of three-dimensional 
CAD to support the PD process. This made it possible to build 
prototypes digitally, perform certain tests with simulation exer-
cises, and perform evaluations. According to an engineer from a 
consulting company that had advised TML on the use of digital 
technology, the design process for the Nano was an advance on 
that for the Indica in terms of computer aided design, digital 
mock-up, digital validation for fi nal assembly, digital validation 
for body, and digital factory modelling (Lim et al 2009: 22).
Transfer of Frugal Engineering Expertise 
One of the major foreign component suppliers for the Nano 
was the Bosch Automotive Group, a German automotive ancil-
lary known for engineering excellence. Dr Bernd Bohr, Chair-
man of the Automotive Group, described the project environ-
ment inside Bosch:
Tata did not come to us with large rulebooks or specifi cations. They 
simply told us what the weight of the car would be, that it would have 
a two-cylinder engine, and would need to achieve Euro 4 emission 
regulation. In addition, it needs to drive, of course. And that was the 
major difference from other auto projects or customers.
Early in the process, one could already see that our teams were coming 
up with new ideas that created a kind of self-momentum. Where usu-
ally one would say that cost reduction is not so exciting for an engi-
neer, here we really had teams having fun. For example, typically each 
cylinder has an injection valve on an engine; here, our engineers came 
up with the idea of saying, let us have one injection valve for two cylin-
ders and give two spray holes so that it takes care of two cylinders. On 
the software side, a typical electronic control unit (or ECU) for a mid-
dle-class car in Europe would have 5,500 parameter groups; for the 
Nano we have 1,700. With that complexity out of the system one can 
have a smaller processor, less power consumption, and so on. Similarly, 
the idle speed control, which keeps the engine at the same 
rest when you are idling, has over 100 parameters you can adjust in a 
typical car. The Nano has seven. Maybe in some cases the RPMs would 
vary by 10 or 20 RPM, the engine will still not stall, and 99% of drivers 
would not notice. But that’s the kind of ‘perfection’ that has accumu-
lated in control systems over the years. 
Questioning things we have taken for granted is useful. We are now 
using low-price vehicles as a training and learning ground to do things 
simpler. In terms of technical innovation itself, I would probably put 
this project at a fi ve or six. There were some things like pushing diesel 
injection from 2000 to 2500 bar, coming up with new materials and 
new laser machining processes, where it would be an eight or nine. 
However, the major challenge was getting across the cost barrier 
while doing all this. That would be a 10 (Palepu et al 2011: 7).
Bohr emphasised that while Bosch would not “buy” itself 
into this market segment and the margins that they expected 
were similar to that on large volume European projects, they 
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anticipated a learning experience. This would later be trans-
ferred to products for their European, American, and Japanese 
customers. He claimed that there were already early success 
stories of this transfer. It was for the fi rst time that Bosch was 
proud of having designed cost reduction (Palepu et al 2011: 8).
The Nano development project was also achieved in close 
cooperation with Tata Technologies Limited (TTL). INCAT is an 
operating company of TTL. The company was a British engi-
neering company until 2005, when it was acquired by the Tata 
group. INCAT’s services include product design, analysis and 
production engineering, and product-centric information 
technology (IT) services including IT services for the digital 
tools supporting product development. It has a cooperative re-
lationship with Dassault system, UGS, and Autodesk, compa-
nies that provide PD digital technology. Its employees number 
3,000 globally, and it has engineering centres in North Amer-
ica, Europe, India, and Thailand. INCAT has been involved 
with the development of the Nano from the start and had 
worked with “a signifi cant number” of Nano’s suppliers. 
Conclusions
The organisation of R&D in TELCO from 1965, the formation of 
Tata Technologies initially in TELCO in 1989, its separation as a 
subsidiary in 1994, and the acquisition of INCAT in 2005 are all 
identifi able stages in the organic and acquired growth of tech-
nological capability within TELCO, later TML, and within the 
Tata Group as a whole. The movement of innovative capabili-
ties in manufacturing processes which preoccupied TELCO 
during the 1970s and 1980s found fruition in the product de-
velopment expertise exemplifi ed by the introduction of the In-
dica, Ace, and Nano. Although the Nano project was consider-
ably aided by the expertise embodied in INCAT, what is of note 
is the absorption of lean design capabilities within Tata Tech-
nologies and its transfer to consultancy projects in advanced 
manufacturing projects and even to its sub systems suppliers 
(BL 2013; BS 2010). 
This paper has concentrated on the evolution of technologi-
cal competence in TELCO/Tata Motors and Tata Technologies. 
This is largely because of the greater attention paid to develop-
ments in these fi rms in the management literature, if not yet in 
the academic fi eld. However, there are indications that other 
Indian fi rms in the automotive sector share these attributes 
(BS 2012). And this allows for the conclusion that not only is 
there a generic competence embodied in what has been 
termed frugal innovation, but that the stage of import substi-
tution and the phased manufacturing programme did indeed 
provide the basis for this now internationally accepted 
achievement (KPMG 2011; Bound and Thornton 2012). 
Note
1   It has been claimed that in the pharmaceutical 
industry, transnational corporations “over-en-
gineer” the R&D process and that  even such 
fi rms which focus so closely on performance 
should include the costs of innovation in their 
strategies (Bhatti and Ventresca 2012: 7 quot-
ing Ryans 2008: 9).
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